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This paper looks at regional cooperation to manage energy scarcity, in 
particular efforts to develop unexplored fossil fuels such as oil and gas in the 
East China and South China Seas as well as efforts to secure the safety of sea 
lines of Communication (SLOCs). In both areas, the main barrier to 
cooperation is the states’ strong adherence to norms of sovereignty and 
domestic non-interference. At the same time, however, the paper finds that 
these Westphalian norms are not surmountable. In a comparative case study 
of Japanese-Russian and Japanese-Chinese energy cooperation in which both 
bilateral relations are plagued by territorial disputes, the former has made 
much more progress than the latter case. Strong leadership and dramatic 
improvement in political relations were significant factors that promoted 
Japanese-Russian energy cooperation. 
 
 
Michael T. Klare argues that the most likely cause of war in the early decades of the 
twenty-first century is resource scarcity.1 The danger of inter-state conflict over access 
to primary energy resources is most acute in East Asia. As modern history shows, 
Japan’s advance into the south of the region during the Second World War was to a 
significant degree an effort to take control of the energy resources in the region. Many 
prominent scholars have voiced such danger of armed conflict over natural resources in 
the region. For example, Kent Calder warned that Asia’s energy insecurities could 
generate regional instability.2 Mark Valencia argued that competition over scarce 
resources could become the catalyst for regional conflict.3 While sceptical of the view 
that military conquest arises directly from energy shortages, Alan Dupont argues that 
competition over natural resources contributes to conflict in the region.4  
This paper takes the view that let alone the danger of conflict over natural resources, 
energy scarcity is in and of itself a grave security concern in East Asia because energy 
shortages can seriously disrupt states’ essential economic activities and affect the lives 
of the people. Serious energy shortages are possible in East Asia for three reasons. First, 
East Asia is poor in raw materials such as oil and natural gas. The Asia-Pacific holds the 
world’s least proven oil reserves of 3.7 percent, compared to 65.4 percent of the most 
oil-abundant region the Middle East.5 Second, confronted by East Asia’s steadily rising 
energy demand and diminishing level of already low self-sufficiency, it is not clear as to 
how East Asian countries could meet their considerable energy insecurities. To make 
matters worse, world’s oil will become less and less available. Some time before 2010, 
global oil production will reach its peak and the depletion of known reserves will pass 
the halfway mark.6 Thirdly, because the region is poor in natural resources as well as in 
production level, East Asian states are heavily dependent on imported oil via sea. The 
sea-lanes or sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are vulnerable to various sources of 
threat. Disruption of the SLOCs can readily hamper states’ economic activities.  
This paper first elaborates on East Asia’s serious energy predicament by illustrating 
its energy patterns and prospects. This section will provide the objectives which East 
Asian states need to cooperatively achieve to manage their energy insecurities. 
Specifically, it focuses on cooperation on natural resource development and sea-lane 
security. A stocktake of cooperation on these two types of cooperation presents different 
puzzles to our understanding of state-to-state cooperation. A puzzle that the first type of 
cooperation—the development of natural resources—presents is why cooperation 
progresses in certain pairs of state and not others despite that both the former and the 
latter are contesting over the issue of territorial sovereignty. What is it that is found in 
the former dyads but is lacking in the latter dyads? What overcomes obstacles to 
cooperation such as sovereignty disputes and facilitates state-to-state cooperation? An 
examination of cooperation on sea-lane security, on the other hand, will give rise to the 
following questions: What are the main obstacles to further promoting sea-lane security 
cooperation? Can states in East Asia overcome the obstacles? If so, how? Providing 
answers to these questions is the aim of this paper. 
 Natural Resource Scarcity and Seaborne Trade 
As many East Asian countries recovered from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 
region’s energy demand is on the rise. The Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre 
(APERC) predicts the APEC region’s oil demand to increase by 2.1 percent per annum 
between 1999 and 2020, nearly 54 percent increase in quantity in twenty-one years 
(40.6 million barrels per day [mbd] in 1999 to 62.4 mbd in 2020).7 Similarly, U.S. 
Department of Energy forecasts that energy demand of developing Asia, where the 
world’s strongest annual growth rate of energy consumption (3 percent) is expected, is 
projected to more than double between 2001 and 2025, which accounts for nearly 40 
percent of the total projected increase in world energy consumption.8 With the expected 
depletion of known global oil reserves and the region’s rising energy consumption, Asia 
will be short of 26 to 31 million barrels of oil (40 percent of world total production in 
1998) by 2020.9 The first question that this paper asks is, as Robert Manning put most 
bluntly, where would some 26 to 31 million barrels of oil come from?10 
Although not enough by itself, most of East Asia’s energy demand will continue to 
be met by imports from other regions, particularly the Middle East. Most Northeast 
Asian states are almost totally dependent on outside resources. Japan, the ROK, China 
and Taiwan are the world’s top importers of primary energy resources. For example, 
Japan imports 99.7 percent of its total oil consumption, 98.4 percent of coal 
consumption and 96.7 percent of natural gas/liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
consumption.11 Similarly, with no domestic oil reserves of its own, the ROK imports all 
of its crude oil, which accounts for 56 percent of its primary energy consumption in 
2000.12 In 2002 China surpassed Japan as the second largest oil consumer of the world 
after the United States.13 Since 1993, the PRC is a net oil importer, and its import 
dependency is expected to rise along with the rise in oil consumption. China’s imports 
are projected to skyrocket from 34 percent in 2002 to more than 80 percent by 2030.14 
Still, Southeast Asia, where many states are oil-exporting economies, has been a net 
oil-importing region since 1993.15 Even Indonesia and Malaysia, the region’s chief oil 
exporters, are expected to turn to oil importers after 2010.16 As a whole, it is expected 
that the Asia-Pacific countries’ import dependency is to increase by 20 percent in the 
next twenty years (60 percent in 1999 to 80 percent in 2020).17  
Virtually all the imported energy resources as well as exports go by sea, for over 
99.5 percent of international trade is waterborne.18 For the Asian export-oriented 
economies, export is the chief form of revenue and the engine of economic growth. In 
fact, in 2002, Asia had by far the largest share (36.8 percent) of the total tonnage of 
world seaborne exports. 19  The two most export-dependent countries for their 
economies in 2000 were Singapore and Malaysia, with the ratio of exports as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately 150 percent and 110 
percent respectively.20 East Asian countries’ high dependency on imports for energy 
resources and on exports for economic growth highlights the importance of 
uninterrupted flow of maritime traffic. The second question is, therefore, what should 
East Asia do to maintain smooth inflow and outflow of raw materials and goods?  
 
Coping with Energy Scarcity 
There are two primary means to address East Asia’s energy insecurities. Confronted by 
the rising energy demand, East Asian countries need to raise the production level of 
energy resources through development of unexplored fossil fuels in areas such as the 
East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Russian Far East. Despite the reported 
existence of one of the world’s most abundant oil and natural gas deposits in these areas, 
most of the resources are still lying idle. Construction of pipelines to transport oil and 
gas to needed countries is also crucial. Secondly, as East Asian countries will continue 
to rely on imported oil from the Middle East and exports for their economic growth, it is 
vitally important to ensure safe maritime transport of energy resources and 
commodities; that is to say, the maintenance of SLOC security. 
Both development of natural resources and the protection of SLOCs require 
cooperation among states as neither can be effectively dealt with unilaterally. For 
instance, oil and gas exploration requires an extremely large amount of money as well 
as advanced technology and equipment. Few countries in East Asia have both at their 
disposal. And, more importantly, natural resources often lie across boundaries. Thus, 
one cannot exploit the seabed without the consultation and cooperation of its 
neighbouring countries. Likewise, no one country is capable of securing the long 
maritime corridors21 flowing into and out of the region. Pirates, moreover, operate in 
total disregard of territorial waters. 
SLOCs are vulnerable to various sources of threat. U.S. Center for Naval Analyses 
identifies five military and four non-military threats. Military threats include an attack 
on commercial shipping by a regional state, conflict between regional states, conflict 
between a regional and a superpower, intervention by an external state and the use of 
mines. Non-military kinds include piracy, accidents, over-regulation by governments 
and oil spills.22  
 
Natural Resource Development 
A remarkable number of bilateral joint development and natural gas pipeline projects 
have been developed or contracted intra-subregionally and inter-subregionally. The ties 
developed through natural gas pipelines and joint development are most dense within 
Southeast Asia. Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia have played primary roles in 
developing natural gas pipelines as most pipelines involve one of these countries.23 
Malaysia and Thailand jointly explore and develop gas in the Malaysia-Thailand Joint 
Development Area (JDA), which is located in the lower part of the Gulf of Thailand. 
Malaysian Petronas and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) signed an 
agreement in 1999 to proceed development of a gas pipeline from the JDA to a plant in 
Songkla province in Thailand, connecting the Malaysia-Thai gas grids. Construction of 
the pipeline began in 2002.  
Indonesia has its large gas field in Natuna located in the South China Sea from 
which Jakarta supplies natural gas to Singapore and Malaysia. Indonesian state 
petroleum company Pertamina began supplying 325 million cubic feet per day of 
natural gas in West Natuna to Singapore in 2001 while the supply of 150 million cubic 
feet per day of natural gas from fields in southern Sumatra to Singapore was 
inaugurated to begin in 2003.24 Thailand and Myanmar have also completed their 
670-kilometer natural gas pipeline in 1999, which connects Burma’s Yadana gas field in 
the Andaman Sea to an Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) power 
plant in Ratchaburi. 25  Transnational pipelines also connect Malaysia and the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand, and possibly Malaysia 
and Brunei.26 The total length of existing and planned or under construction natural gas 
pipelines combined amounts to 18,000 kilometres.27 
The foregoing dense network of bilateral gas pipelines in Southeast Asia developed 
into a multilateral project in 2002. At the Twentieth ASEAN Ministers Energy Meeting 
in July 2002, the ASEAN countries signed the ASEAN Memorandum of Understanding 
on the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) Project, the idea of which has been floating 
since the early 1990s. The TAGP Project will interconnect the members’ seven 
cross-border and domestic gas pipelines in the Gulf of Thailand, South China Sea and 
Sumatra. The seven gas pipelines are Malaysia-Singapore, Thailand-Myanmar, 
Indonesia-Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia-Malaysia, Malaysia-Thailand and 
South Sumatra-Singapore.28 Also, in September 2002, it was declared that a new 
5000-kilometer natural gas pipeline would be built through the APEC forum’s 
Partnership for Equitable Growth (PEG). The pipeline, which will be Asia’s largest, will 
link an Indonesian gas field with China, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam.29  
In Northeast Asia, cooperation on resource development is limited, though it is 
expanding gradually. There are two bilateral joint development agreements in Northeast 
Asia. One was reached between Japan and South Korea in 1974, establishing a Joint 
Development Zone in the Sea of Japan. Exploration began in September 1979, but so 
far no oil has been found.30 The other bilateral venture agreement in Northeast Asia is 
in place between Beijing and Taipei, despite lack of formal ties between them. Upon the 
completion of the joint seismic surveys in 1999, China’s state-owned oil firm China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Taiwan’s national oil company 
Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC) signed an agreement in May 2002 to explore an 
approximately 6000-square-mile area in the Taiwan Basin of the Taiwan Strait.31 
The network of multilateral joint development is also emerging in Northeast Asia. In 
the Russian Far East, there are eight giant multinational oil and gas exploration projects, 
namely the Sakhalin projects. Advancing the Sakhalin projects is critically important 
especially to Northeast Asian countries because Sakhalin is the largest source of oil and 
natural gas for the entire Asia-Pacific region.32 The combined gas supply of the 
Sakhalin-I and –II alone could meet 12.2 percent (twenty-nine trillion cubic feet) of the 
region’s demand.33 The most advanced project is the Sakhalin-II, which is ventured by 
Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, which together form Sakhalin Energy Investment 
Company (Sakhalin Energy). The Sakhalin-II consortium produced its first petroleum in 
1999 and exported approximately 11.7 billion barrels of oil to China and South Korea in 
2000.34 It is expected that the project’s first LNG shipment is to begin in 2006, and 
Tokyo Electric Power Company has already announced its plan to import 120 tonnes of 
LNG annually for twenty-two years from April 2007.35 Furthermore, the consortium of 
the Sakhalin-I decided in 2002 to build a 1,440-kilometre gas pipeline directly from 
Sakhalin to Tokyo.36  
Eastern Siberia is another area where joint development and pipeline projects are 
expected to be undertaken in the near future. Oil imports from Siberia and Sakhalin can 
lower Japan’s Middle East dependence by nearly twenty percent.37 There are two 
proposed oil pipelines competed by China and Japan. The Chinese-backed Daqing route 
(Angarsk to Daqing) is a 2200-kilometre pipeline which would carry 600,000 barrels of 
oil a day whereas the Japanese-backed Nakhodka route (Angarsk to Nakhodka) is a 
4000-kilometre pipeline which would ship one million barrels of oil a day.38 The 
relevant Russian authorities are opting for the project.  
While cooperation has progressed between and among East Asian states to address 
the region’s energy shortage, interestingly no joint development agreements are reached 
in the areas of the East and South China Seas and the Yellow Sea despite that the East 
and South China Seas are believed to contain a large amount of oil and gas. The absence 
of cooperative arrangements in these waters challenges theories of International 
Relations in that international cooperation does not necessarily occur even when the 
conditions are met. The degree of cooperation differs not only from one issue-area to 
another, but also within one issue area. In the case of energy security, why is 
international cooperation discernible in certain dyads of state and not others? Why isn’t 
there cooperation in the East China Sea (China and Japan), the South China Sea (Brunei, 
China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam) or the Yellow Sea (China and 
the ROK)?  
A common explanation for the absence of agreements between and among these 
countries is that the issues of sovereignty and territoriality are involved in these seas. In 
the waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Japan and China are unable to agree on 
the delimitation of the continental shelf, and differences in their approach towards 
delimitation have yielded irreconcilable gap in demarcating an area to be jointly 
developed. 39  Such an explanation appears to apply particularly well to the 
Japanese-Chinese case in light of the fact that the two countries were able to reach a 
new fishery agreement in the East China Sea in 1997, though the negotiations were by 
no means smooth for it took more than two years to put the agreement into effect. 
Tokyo and Beijing set up a Temporary Co-Management Fishery Zone between 27 
degrees and 30.4 degrees north latitude and a zone called the Central Zone north of 
30.40 degrees north latitude.40 But fishing activities will remain the same as before in 
the southern part of the East China Sea—south of 27 degrees north latitude and west of 
125.3 degrees east longitude—where the Senkakus are located between 25.44 and 25.56 
degrees north latitude.41 Mainichi editorial, for example, wrote that both sides could not 
work out the southern area due to the existence of the sovereignty dispute over the 
islands.42  
The same obstacle is said to prevent joint development in the Yellow Sea where 
Beijing and Seoul cannot agree on how to delimit a joint development zone.43 Similarly, 
in the South China Sea, while China proposes joint development with other ASEAN 
claimants, the latter are reluctant to engage in such undertakings. The main reason for 
their objection is that the idea proposed by China is not consistent but selective. That is, 
China’s idea of joint development aims at the areas that are under the jurisdiction of 
other countries such as the Tu Chinh area of Vietnam or the Natuna area of 
Indoenesia,44  and thus the ASEAN claimants perceive the Chinese formula with 
reservations that Beijing is trying to legitimize its sovereignty claim of territories of 
others. A Vietnamese scholar, for example, wrote that the premise for Chinese joint 
development idea is “the sovereignty in the South China Sea belongs to China.”45 
Although the point is well taken and the issue of sovereignty does seem to influence 
the outcome of joint development proposals negatively, the existence of sovereignty 
dispute does not negate the possibility of such cooperation. For example, although the 
territorial claims over the Northern Territories or the Kurile Islands remain unresolved, 
Japan and Russia are cooperating through the Sakhalin projects and Tokyo is very keen 
on oil in Eastern Siberia. The hypothesis that sovereignty disputes inhibit energy 
security cooperation therefore cannot explain why Japan cooperates with Russia but not 
with China. 
One likely counter-argument is that Japan could cooperate with Russia in Sakhalin 
and Eastern Siberia because the dispute is over the sovereignty of the Northern 
Territories, not the former regions. Thus, Tokyo and Moscow would find easier to 
shelve the dispute since joint development does not require the solution of the Northern 
Territories. However, Japan and China, on the other hand, cannot cooperate because 
joint development of the East China Sea directly involves the sovereignty of the 
Senkakus. Tokyo and Beijing find themselves in a more difficult situation than Tokyo 
and Moscow do.  
However, this explanation does not stand well either because the primary reason that 
Japan had been reluctant to undertake joint development projects with Russia was the 
lingering dispute over the Northern Territories even though Japanese companies had 
strong interests in Russian Far East over the years. The Japanese government had put 
the Northern Territories at the centre of its Russian policy for years, and Russia’s 
recognition of sovereignty over all the disputed islands was the precondition not only 
for a peace treaty but also for business enterprises.46 Why, then, is Japan now earnestly 
engaging in and seeking natural resource development projects with Russia despite the 
fact that the territorial sovereignty of the islands remains contested? The answer to the 
question should reveal what propels international cooperation between states with 
territorial sovereignty disputes. 
 
Japanese-Russian Energy Cooperation 
Two factors made energy security cooperation possible between Tokyo and Moscow: 
dramatic improvement in the Japanese-Russian relations in the 1990s and the leadership 
of the premiers. Improvement in the bilateral relations laid the groundwork for strong 
leadership to be exercised. These two factors are closely connected to each other, and an 
analysis of how improvement in the Japanese-Russian relations was brought about is in 
order.  
In the wake of the end of the Cold War, officials of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) became increasingly aware that it was not in Japan’s national interests 
to keep the Japanese-Russian relations in stalemate. Firstly, consideration for regional 
balance of power was prevalent within the Ministry. Moscow was improving its 
relations with Washington and Beijing in the early 1990s. Under the circumstances, it 
was natural for the MOFA officials to realize that the weakest bilateral relations among 
the four major powers in East Asia (the United States, China, Japan and Russia) were 
those between Japan and Russia. MOFA officials had misgivings about being isolated 
from the other three powers unless the Japanese-Russian relations were improved. It 
was thus in Japan’s interests not to be left out from the United States and China, 
especially at a time when Japan’s economic power was in decline after the bubble burst.   
There was also international pressure or gaiatsu from the international community, 
especially the members of the Group of Seven (G-7). While the developed countries had 
been forging a program of support for Russia’s political and economic reforms, Tokyo 
could not promote cooperation with Moscow because of the Northern Territories. Such 
Japan’s backward position toward Russian reforms drew criticism from the other 
members of the G-7. To dispel such criticism, there was a feeling within the MOFA that 
only through real actions could refutations become convincing and could Japan win the 
support of the international community.47 
Finally, there was a shift in Japan’s Russian policy. The shift was brought about 
after the cancellation of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s visit to Japan in September 
1992. The cancellation of the visit bred a sense of crisis within the Foreign Ministry that 
the “basic framework” of the Japanese-Russian relations could crumble.48 This sense of 
crisis led to a change in Japanese Russian policy, from what one scholar called the 
Owada-Hyodo line to the Edamura line.49 The Owada-Hyodo line, led by Hisashi 
Owada and Nagao Hyodo, prioritized the return of the islands, taking precedence over 
the rapprochement with Russia. The Owada-Hyodo line favoured linking the territorial 
issue with economics, the latter serving as bait to the territorial issue. By contrast, the 
Edamura line, named after Sumio Edamura, placed the achievement of rapprochement 
with Russia at the centre of Japan’s Russian policy. Edamura took the position that 
economics should be separated from politics, believing that economic aid to Russia 
would bring about the rapprochement of the two countries and the improved bilateral 
relations could eventually lead to the return of the disputed islands to Japan.  
The balance-of-power consideration, international pressure and the shift in policy 
from the inseparability to the separation of politics from economics drove the Japanese 
government to seek for improvement on relations with Russia. Under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, the Japanese government developed a policy 
labelled as a multilayered approach at the beginning of 1997. The multilayered 
approach sought to broaden the range of areas of cooperation including political and 
security dialogue, economic cooperation, culture, human exchanges, science and 
technology, etc, and progress on them did not need to be balanced with progress on the 
Northern Territories question.50  
On the Russian side, too, Moscow saw improvement of relations with Tokyo was in 
Russia’s best interests. The expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 
forced Russia to seek a counterweight to balance the United States and Western 
European countries. The Russian government sought closer cooperation with China. 
However, for a variety of reasons Moscow could not rely on China alone as these two 
countries had been in strife for years. Against this backdrop, the Russian keenly felt the 
need to improve relations with Japan.51 
The Japanese-Russian relations dramatically improved after Prime Minister 
Hashimoto came to power in 1996. Hashimoto was able to exercise strong leadership as 
the groundwork for improved Japanese-Russian relations had already begun since the 
early 1990s. Hashimoto felt the need to strengthen the ties between Japan and Russia as 
in the emerging quadrangle—the United States, China, Japan and Russia—it was these 
ties that had been the weakest.52 Hashimoto also developed close personal relations 
with President Yeltsin. Hashimoto forged his Eurasian policy and in July 1997 delivered 
an unprecedented speech in the history of bilateral relations with Russia, which 
incorporated the infamous Hashimoto’s Three Principles toward Russia, policies based 
on trust, mutual interest and long-term perspective. Based on the Three Principles 
Hashimoto stressed the need to widen the range of cooperation, including energy 
security cooperation. Hashimoto stated that Japan should pay particular attention to 
economic cooperation and, specifically, the development of energy resources in Siberia 
and the Russian Far East.53 Hence, the leadership of the leaders of the two countries 
accelerated the pace of improvement between them and made a breakthrough in the area 
of energy security cooperation.  
More recently, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has picked up the momentum of 
the Japanese-Russian relations and been expressing Japan’s interests in Russia’s natural 
resources, especially those in Siberia. After Koizumi visited Khabarovsk in January 
2003 and agreed with President Vladimir Putin to develop energy resources and 
construct a pipeline for transportation in the Russian Far East and the Siberian region, 
Japan and Russia are continuing talks through such mechanisms as the Japan-Russia 
Energy Consultations. Japan is making strenuous efforts to realize the Nakhodka route 
or the Pacific pipeline. 
By contrast the strong leadership that existed in the Japanese-Russian relations is 
not discernible in the relations between Japan and China, even though the relations 
between the latter two countries have improved greatly in the 1990s. Selig Harrison 
argues that joint natural resource development in the East China Sea between Japan and 
China depends not only on their overall bilateral relations but also on the status of the 
Kurile Islands. According to Harrison, Japan is reluctant to suspend its territorial claims 
to the Senkakus for the sake of joint exploration and development with China, a 
prerequisite for seabed cooperation there, lest this set a precedent that would undermine 
its stance in the Kurile Islands.54 However, Japan can in theory also employ a 
multilayered approach with China as it separated politics from economics with Russia 
and go on to undertake seabed cooperation in the East China Sea. After all, the Japanese 
government provides aid to the peoples of the Northern Territories despite that Tokyo 
continues to contest the sovereignty of the four islands. Moreover, Japan and China 
were able to set aside the issue of the boundary delimitation of EEZs when they 
concluded the 1997 Fishery Agreement. Thus, if the Japanese-Russian experience is any 
guide, leadership is necessary to break the continuing deadlock in the East China Sea.   
 
Sea-Lane Security 
There are two principal sea-lanes in East Asia, one passing through the South China Sea 
to the Indian Ocean and to the Persian Gulf, the other passing through the East China 
Sea to the Sea of Japan and to the Pacific Ocean. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore 
are the world’s two busiest straits, with more than 200 ships transiting daily. Transit via 
these straits provides the shortest sea-route between the Indian Ocean and the South 
China Sea. An alternative longer route passes through the Straits of Lombok and 
Makassar or the Sunda Strait. The task of East Asian states is to ensure the security of 




The problem of piracy is nowhere more serious than East Asia as nearly three-quarters 
of the world’s piracy incidents now take place in the region. Under international law, 
piracy is defined as illegal acts of violence or detention committed for private ends on 
the high seas.55 Piracy may not threaten states’ survival directly, but it is arguably “the 
single greatest menace” to the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), which 
may consequently destabilize states’ economies.56 As Japanese senior state secretary 
for foreign affairs stated, “Piracy not only poses a threat to the transportation routes of 
Japan…[but] could also have a major impact on the social stability and economic 
prosperity of the entire region.”57  
Joint or coordinated patrols between regional maritime agencies are effective in 
clamping down on piracy. The hot spot of piracy in the region is the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore. After a surge of piratical incidents in the early 1990s, especially 1991, 
the coastal states of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore—Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore—agreed in 1992 to conduct coordinated patrols. Indonesia and Singapore 
reached an agreement on hot pursuit as well as to set up direct communications links 
between their navies for coordinated patrols in the Singapore Strait while Indonesia and 
Malaysia agreed to arrange a joint Maritime Operation Planning Team to provide joint 
patrols in the Malacca Strait.58 The piracy incidents in these two Straits resulted in 
virtually a complete reduction of piracy for several years after 1992 as a result of these 
cooperative arrangements. Malaysia also conducts joint naval patrols with the 
Philippines (the Malaysia-Philippines Border Patrol Coordinating Group: PCG) and 
Thailand (the Gulf of Thailand and Andaman Sea) whereas Indonesia conducts with 
India. 
The effectiveness of coordinated patrols is also shown in the early 2000s. The 
number of piratical incidents increased in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. 
The worst year was 2000, with 60 percent increase from the previous year. Among the 
469 pirate attacks reported to the IMB worldwide, more than two-thirds occurred in 
Asian waters, with most taking place in Indonesian waters.59 Piratical attacks also 
increased in the Malacca Strait, with an increase in number from two to seventy-five. 
Thanks again to coordinated anti-piracy measures of Malaysia and Singapore around the 
Strait, with a 77 percent drop (seventy-five to seventeen incidents) in 2001. But, the 
number of pirate attacks has not decreased in the Indonesian waters. Indonesia has 
marked the highest number of attacks since as late as 1999. 
Anti-piracy arrangements are also in place between Northeast Asian countries. After 
the decrease of piratical incidents in the Malacca and Singapore Straits in the early 
1990s, the focus shifted northeastward to the East and South China Seas, particularly 
the Hong Kong-Luzon-Hainan Island (HLH) triangle between 1992 and 1994. 
Mirroring seventy-eight cases of piratical incidents by Chinese rogue elements between 
1991 and 1993, Japan proposed to Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen during his 
visit to Tokyo in February1993 that coastguard officials from the two countries should 
meet to discuss the piracy issue. China agreed to an informal meeting which was held 
four months later where the two countries arranged to establish a hotline to deal with 
future incidents. The number of shipping incidents in the East China Sea over the 
following year reported to Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA) was reduced to 
only one.60 In addition, JMSA has conducted joint anti-piracy exercises with India, 
Malaysia and the Philippines.61 
In addition to coordinated anti-piracy patrols and exercises, the IMB established a 
regional Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur in October 1992. The Centre alerts 
ships and law enforcement agencies, receives and analyses reports of suspicious 
shipping movements and reports to relevant organizations, and issues piracy reports 
regularly. Also in March 2000, Coast Guards and relevant maritime agencies in East 
Asia agreed to establish piracy information centres to reduce the increasing incidents of 
piracy.62 
 
Prevention and Management of Accidents and Oil Spills 
Collision and grounding of ships may result from an increase in the size, speed and 
number of vessels transiting narrow, shallow and busy straits such as the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore. Regional cooperation to prevent maritime accidents has been 
promoted and effective in East Asia. The most important and effective measure is a 
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) developed by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in 
1981 by the Tripartite Technical Expert Group (TTEG) to regulate traffic and minimize 
sea accidents in the Singapore Strait. To ensure compliance with the TSS, a voluntary 
Vessel Traffic Information Scheme (VTIS) was set up in Singapore. The TSS was so 
effective that no serious casualty was reported to have occurred within the confines of 
the Scheme until 1993.63 However, as the number of collisions, some of them major, 
began increasing in areas outside the Scheme, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
revised the TSS in 1998. The revised TSS set up a new routing system which imposed 
an under keel clearance of at least 3.5 metres for VLCCs (very large crude carriers) 
during the entire passage through the Straits.64 To further improve navigational safety, 
moreover, a mandatory ship reporting system known as STRAITREP was adopted. 
The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the only multilateral naval 
cooperative framework in the Asia-Pacific, brings together naval officials from eighteen 
countries to discuss common maritime concerns such as SLOC security and the safety 
of navigation as well as to enhance navy-to-navy cooperation. A series of workshops 
led to the creation of a Maritime Information Exchange Directory, a WPNS Tactical 
Signals Handbook and a WPNS Replenishment at Sea Handbook.65 The ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) is another important venue where maritime security is discussed. 
Issues of maritime security are often considered in the CBM context in the ARF. To 
support maintaining maritime safety, the ARF Regional Maritime Information Centre 
(ARF-RMIC), based on the National Marine Data and Information Service of China, 
was created to provide maritime data and information to the ARF members.66  
Almost all the states in the region—except a landlocked state Laos—are also 
committed to international law of the sea. One key regional treaty is a port state control 
(PSC) agreement, which establishes a system that ensures port authorities that all 
foreign ships sailing into their ports are without any deficiencies and comply with the 
requirements of the international maritime conventions. Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) on PSC in the Asia-Pacific Region, known as the Tokyo MOU, was opened for 
signature in December 1993 and has been signed by eighteen authorities.67 In addition, 
mirroring the Bali bombing and the explosion of a French tanker in the Gulf of Aden, 
port authorities of ASEAN are planning to institute a shipping and security database to 
be shared among its members to enhance their information gathering capabilities.68 
Many countries in East Asia are also signatories to key IMO conventions, including the 
1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREG), the 1974 International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the 
1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) and the 1979 International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR). Finally, bilateral incidents-at-sea (INCSEA) 
agreements are in force between the United States and Russia, Japan and Russia, South 
Korea and Russia and China and the United States. 
Regional countries are committed not only to pre-accidents but also post-accidents. 
Seminars on search and rescue (SAR), training and SAR exercises have increasingly 
been taken place in the region. A dense bilateral SAR network is in place in Southeast 
Asia, particularly between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Northeast Asian states 
have also begun conducting SAR exercises since the 1990s. Such operations are 
conducted between China and the United States, Japan and Russia, and Japan and South 
Korea. There are three main multilateral SAR exercises to maintain the safety at sea as 
well as SLOC security. They are RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific), Pacific Reach and 
MCMEX (Western Pacific Mine Countermeasure Exercise). 
Oil spills can also disrupt the safety of navigation, as large-scale oil spills may lead 
to prohibition or restriction of passage. Examples of such oil spill incidents include the 
Showa Maru in 1976, the Nagasaki Spirit in 1992, the Maersk Navigator in 1993, the 
Nakohdka in 1997 and the Evoikos in 1997. The number of oil tankers plying the Straits 
of Malacca and Singapore increased fourfold between 1979 and 1997, which suggests 
an enduring risk of oil spill incidents.  
In 1981, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Japan’s Malacca Straits Council 
created a revolving fund of 400 million yen for the former three littoral states to use in 
combating oil spills in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. The fund is used for 
immediate clean-up operations in the event of oil spill incidents. For example, in the 
1992 Nagasaki Spirit incident Malaysia and Indonesia sought an advanced sum of US 
580,000 and 660,000 dollars for oil clean-up respectively.69 A number of training and 
joint oil spill exercises have also been conducted to test a standard operating procedure 
(SOP), which was introduced by a Committee of the fund.70 On a larger scale, ASEAN 
signed a memorandum of understanding in 1993 to develop an Oil Spill Response 
Action Plan (OSRAP) to improve the association’s marine oil spill combating capability 
in Southeast Asia. To that end, Japan makes financial contributions by providing one 
billion yen worth of oil spill equipment to ASEAN countries.71  
 
Anti-Piracy Cooperation and Norms of Sovereignty and Non-Interference 
Cooperation to maintain the security of SLOCs is a good example in which international 
cooperation has progressed in East Asia. As the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are 
often called chokepoints and are at the heart of sea lane security, regional states have 
focused their cooperation on the areas. While cooperation is denser in Southeast Asia as 
the three littoral states of the Straits—Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore—took the 
lead, Northeast Asian countries have begun cooperating especially since the 1990s. 
Given the critical need to cooperate to security the safety of navigation as well as the 
favourable conditions for cooperation in the 1990s, it was natural to observe such 
progress in regional cooperation. 
Having said that, SLOC security cooperation in the region is by no means flawless, 
especially on anti-piracy efforts. The recent piratical trends tell us that the region’s 
anti-piracy framework has not necessarily kept abreast of the current trends. This is best 
indicated in Indonesia where the number of piracy has remained high since 1999. 
Although the increase in the number of piracy in the Indonesian waters is due in part to 
insufficient allocation of funds and resources to relevant Indonesian authorities 
following the Asian financial crisis, a more fundamental challenge lies elsewhere. 
While joint sea patrol is effective and still necessary, the current era has reached the 
point where coordinated patrols alone are no longer sufficient to maintain sea lane 
security. Correctly, it is not joint patrols per se that is at issue, but the states’ attitude 
that hinder improvement on maritime patrols. Probably the most important task for East 
Asia countries is to better coordinate their maritime law enforcement agencies. And, the 
main obstacle to this objective stems from the intransigent adherence of some states to 
norms of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of others. 
At least two cooperative arrangements can promote better coordination of maritime 
law enforcement agencies: conclusion of hot pursuit agreements and cooperation in 
inshore waters and within ports. Hot pursuit is the right to chase sea criminals—pirates, 
terrorists, etc.—beyond national boundaries. Hot pursuit is a necessary mechanism to 
capture pirates as they operate beyond national waters. But, because many Asian states 
are strongly committed to norms of sovereignty and domestic non-interference, they are 
reluctant to either chase sea criminals beyond their borders or prosecute other nationals 
under their jurisdiction. In fact, coordinated maritime patrols between states extend only 
as far as their own national boundaries. Accordingly, there is only one hot pursuit 
agreement in the region, between Indonesia and Singapore. The conclusion of more hot 
pursuit agreements is an impending task so as to disallow pirates to “find sanctuary by 
crossing territorial boundaries.”72 
Firm commitment by Asian countries to norms of sovereignty and domestic 
non-interference has similarly resulted in poor endorsement of the 1988 Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation or the 
Rome Convention, which allows state parties to chase beyond their borders, prosecute 
and extradite alleged offenders under their national laws. The effectiveness of the Rome 
Convention is illustrated in the region. Although the Chinese government had freed 
pirates after seizure in the past, pirates will now be executed when caught as China 
legislated itself upon signing the Convention. The number of piracy around Chinese 
waters has dramatically decreased since then. 73  Despite the effectiveness of the 
Convention, only six states (Brunei, China, Japan, Myanmar, the ROK and Vietnam) 
are signatories to this treaty in East Asia.74  
Secondly, anti-piracy cooperation in internal waters and at ports is also imperative. 
Most illegal acts of violence at sea in the region today are opportunistic or petty theft, 
which often takes place in inshore waters.75 In the period between 1995 and 1999 86.5 
percent of piratical attacks in the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea had occurred 
in territorial waters or within ports.76 However, as mentioned, under international law 
piracy refers only to illegal acts of violence committed on the high seas. Thus, criminal 
acts in territorial waters are not classified as piracy. Due to their sensitivities over 
sovereignty, many ASEAN states, too, classify such acts as sea robbery—a domestic 
crime.77 This conceptualization does not reflect the recent trends of piracy in the region, 
however. Regional states should not distinguish the whereabouts of piratical acts and 
should understand piracy as defined by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which reads: an act of boarding or 
attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with 
the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.78  
Taking cooperative actions against such ‘sea robbery’ requires cooperation between 
law enforcement agencies on land. As Rear Admiral Richard Lim, chief of the 
Singaporean Navy, said, “It is important to complement maritime patrols with effective 
police action on land…Ultimately it is more effective to catch [pirates] at places where 
they are operating from, and use police intelligence to find out where they are getting 
rid of their loot.”79 Conducting cooperation against piracy in others’ territorial waters is 
particularly a difficult task for Asian states which strongly abide by the norms of 
sovereignty and domestic non-interference. Nonetheless, as pirates are also using 
advanced information technology, a clampdown on piracy is becoming increasingly a 
complicated business in the 21st century. It is thus imperative that countries in this 
region improve their anti-piracy cooperation before, as many shipowners say, “pirates 




Bilateralism and Multilateralism 
In the literature of International Relations, there is a consensus among scholars that 
bilateral cooperation is easier to achieve than multilateral cooperation because 
transaction costs and the danger of cheating are lower in bilateral cooperation.81 
However, the findings of this paper suggest that this is not necessarily the case. Joint 
development of natural resources in the Russian Far Eastern region is a case in point. 
Although the Sakhalin II project developed along with the process of improvement on 
the Japanese-Russian relations, the agreement of the project was reached prior to 
Hashimoto’s Three Principles speech in 1997, which expressed Japan’s interests in 
pursuing bilateral energy resource development with Russia. 
The Southeast Asian experience suggests, nonetheless, that the existence of bilateral 
cooperation or prior experience in cooperation is an important contributor to achieving 
multilateral cooperation. It seems that a so-called ‘spider web’ model of bilateral 
cooperation establishes multilateral links or a virtual multilateral framework among 
them. The Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) is a clear example. The existence of a 
spider web network naturally led to the emergence of multilateral gas pipeline project. 
Another example is a quasi-multilateral (trilateral, to be precise) network in anti-piracy 
cooperation. While there is no multilateral agreement, by conducting bilateral 
coordinated patrols in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore construct multilateral links. The spider web network is gradually expanding 
as India, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand join the three littoral states for joint patrols 
to crack down on piracy.  
 
Historical Animosities 
In 1999 when Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi proposed an establishment of a 
regional Coastguard body to conduct maritime patrols in the Southeast Asian waters 
including the South China Sea and Indonesian waters, some countries in the region 
opposed to the proposition, especially China. Their response to Japan’s proposition was 
understood as stemming from historical animosities. For example, Mark Valencia 
argued, “Bitter memories in the region of Japan's brutal wartime occupation…are major 
obstacles to carrying out the proposal.”82  
While historical animosities towards Japan may still exist among countries and as a 
consequence may affect international relations in East Asia, such feelings do not appear 
as ‘major obstacles’ to regional cooperation. Japan and China established a hotline in 
1993 and cooperate against piracy in the East China Sea. Japan and the ROK have also 
set up a hotline in 1999 and have been conducting bilateral search and rescue exercises 
since 1999. Furthermore, while Malaysia has reportedly declined Obuchi’s regional 
Coastguard proposal,83 Japan has conducted anti-piracy exercises with Malaysia as well 
as with the Philippines.  
Similarly, it may first seem that one of the reasons that cooperation on natural 
resource development is far denser in Southeast Asian than Northeast Asia results from 
the past experience of Japan’s brutal atrocities. But, the ROK, which, together with 
China, has the bitterest memories, reached an agreement on joint development with 
Japan in 1974. While historical animosities may still have some impact on international 
relations in the region, they are no longer a decisive factor in facilitating cooperation.  
 
Norms of Sovereignty and Domestic Non-Interference 
A more influential factor than historical animosities is Westphalian norms of 
sovereignty and domestic non-interference. As shown in SLOC security cooperation, 
strong adherence of some East Asian states to these norms remains a challenge to more 
effective anti-piracy cooperation. Having said that, policy-makers need not be 
overwhelmed by the negative impacts that these norms may have on cooperation for 
two reasons. First, while East Asian states have consistently abided by these norms 
throughout the 1990s, they have also made important progress in anti-piracy 
cooperation in the decade, and their efforts were effective. On the positive side, 
therefore, states can advance regional cooperation despite concern about sovereignty. 
Put differently, norms of sovereignty and domestic non-interference are not so 
influential as to totally prevent anti-piracy cooperation.  
Secondly, and more importantly, concern for sovereignty is not an insurmountable 
barrier. The region’s experience tells that cooperation on natural resource development 
tends to stagnate when an issue of territorial sovereignty is involved. The examples 
include joint development between Japan and China, the ROK and China and China and 
the other disputants in the South China Sea. But, as shown in energy cooperation 
between Tokyo and Moscow, strong leadership and the underlying decent political 
relations are crucial in overcoming states’ concern for sovereignty.    
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